Canadian courts have struggled to interpret the "prescribed by law" requirement contained in section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, they have frustrated the achievement of its three functions: furthering the rule of law; heightening accountability; and providing additional protection for the individual. The flawed analytical framework set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Slaight Communications (1989) was worsened by the recent decision in Doré (2012). I argue for a return to the pre-Doré situation, as outlined in the majority reasons of Justice Charron in Multani (2006). I also argue that improvements to the analytical framework can be effected by using the tools of administrative law. Justification, transparency and intelligibility are the touchstones of reasonableness in administrative decision-making. Administrative decision-makers who fail to confine, structure and check their discretion by adopting "soft law" instruments, such as publicly available guidelines, risk seeing their decisions struck down as unreasonable by reviewing courts. And if decisions are unreasonable, they cannot be "prescribed by law" within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter. This argument responds to some of the flaws of the Slaight Communications framework and helps to achieve the functions of the "prescribed by law" requirement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interpreting the "prescribed by law" requirement contained in section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter") has proved a vexing task for the Supreme Court of Canada ("the Court"), one that it has struggled to accomplish in a coherent and consistent manner. That judges struggled to grapple with an abundance of distinctions -between law and discretion, general norms and individualized decisions, administrative law and constitutional law -should not be surprising. Academics, too, have failed to come up with solutions that undermine the distinctions without proposing further or alternative distinctions that are liable to be just as difficult to apply. Lexis Nexis, 2010), 145, at 161 (proposing that "soft law" mechanisms should be subject to Charter review where they have a "meaningful influence" on exercises of discretion). There is much to be said for these various proposals. One thing that cannot be said, however, is that they replace distinctions with clear rules. 
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Public signs and posters and commercial advertising must be in French.
They may also be both in French and in another language provided that French is markedly predominant.
Consider In order to justify an infringement, the state must satisfy the well-known proportionality test set out by the Court in R v Oakes, 13 but in order even to reach this stage, the state must demonstrate that the infringement was "prescribed by law". 14 In the French version of section 1, no equivalent of "prescribed" appears, but reference is made to the possibility that a Charter right can be infringed by a « règle de droit ».
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The phrase "prescribed by law" carries two separate senses. 16 These separate senses can be perceived by reference to the ambiguity of the word "prescribed". On the one hand, "prescribed" can be equated with "authorized", and be read as imposing a formalalbeit venerable 17 -requirement that state action infringing a protected right be grounded in some legal instrument:
The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements.
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Where the limitation on a Charter right results from the independent action of a state official, unmoored from statutory authority, it cannot be saved under section 1. On the other hand, the word "prescribed" evokes meaningful standards Indeed, the very requirement that some sort of general norm be in place as a matter of form carries functional effects along with it. 24 Moreover, the word "prescribed" suggests that, for something to qualify as having been "prescribed" there must be more than an order or assertion. In short, the order or assertion must have substantive content; in particular, it must have a "degree of precision or explicitness", 25 providing an "intelligible standard according to which the judiciary must do its work".
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Both the formal and substantive senses of the phrase "prescribed by law" can be discerned in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights:
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[T]he following are two of the requirements that flow from the expression "prescribed by law". Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the 20 [1985] 9 legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able -if need be with appropriate advice -to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.
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The affinity between both the substantive and formal senses of the "prescribed by law" requirement and the rule of law is close. 34 The aim is to ensure that individuals are not "vulnerable to interference by public officials acting on any personal whim, caprice, malice, predilection or purpose other than that for which the power was conferred". 35 Indeed, given that the purpose of the Charter is to protect fundamental rights, it seems sensible to interpret its provisions in such a way as to protect Charter rights.
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In addition, requiring that limitations on Charter rights be "prescribed by law" serves an accountability function. It obliges the legislature to "squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost". 37 As Lorraine Weinrib has put it:
The executive may not attempt to justify a Charter infringement for which it has not taken political responsibility, and the courts need not deliberate upon the 11 justifiability of the objectionable law or policy unless that responsibility has been assumed.
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The "prescribed by law" requirement also increases the protection for Charter rights.
Rather than assessing simply whether the exigencies of the Oakes test have been satisfied, a reviewing court must also assess whether whatever hurdles are imposed by the "prescribed by law" requirement have been surmounted. On the face of it, the very existence of the "prescribed by law requirement" makes it more difficult for the state to justify infringements of Charter rights. 39 This seems to have been the intention of the drafters. The "prescribed by law" requirement was added in the third draft of the Charter, accompanied by the following explanatory note:
This proposed amendment would narrow the limits that could be placed on the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. For a right to be limited, the limitation would be required to be prescribed by law and to be both reasonable and capable of being demonstrably justified.
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Thus the "prescribed by law" requirement has three key characteristics, which combine to give it a "special gate-keeper function" 41 : it has both a formal and substantive sense which underpin the rule of law; it serves an accountability function; and it increases protection for Charter rights. But these three characteristics have been compromised by the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada.
III. THE SLAIGHT COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK
The analytical framework for the "prescribed by law" requirement was laid out by Lamer J., writing for the majority on this point, noted that two possible situations could arise. First, the disputed order may have been "made pursuant to legislation which confers, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to infringe a protected right". 44 In such cases, the reviewing court should subject the legislation to the Oakes test. Secondly, however, it may be the case that the empowering legislation "confers an imprecise discretion and does not confer, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to limit the rights guaranteed by the Charter". 45 In such cases, the reviewing court should subject the order to the Oakes test, for it is the order that is the source of the limitation of the individual's Charter rights: "The Slaight case law envisioned individual and isolated discretionary acts, which were juxtaposed to mandatory acts dictated by clear legislation". 46 As the Court subsequently explained:
First, legislation may be found to be unconstitutional on its face because it violates a Charter right and is not saved by section 1. In such cases, the legislation will be invalid and the Court compelled to declare it of no force or effect...Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the actions of a delegated decision-maker in applying it. In such cases, the legislation remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought... However, in 'type two' cases, where the limit arises from an administrative decision, then an examination of whether the decision-maker acted within jurisdictional boundaries is substituted for an assessment of whether the legislation contains an intelligible standard. The limit is seen to have been imposed by the decision taken by the decisionmaker. In determining whether the limit was "prescribed by law", the reviewing court will look only to whether the decision-maker had the power to make the impugned decision: in classical parlance, an intra vires decision is one "prescribed by law" but an ultra vires decision is not. If it is an intra vires decision, a proportionality test will then be applied to the decision; but if it is ultra vires, it is simply not "prescribed by law" and no further steps need be taken by the court. [1991] 2 SCR 69 at 94 (SCC): "The uncertainty may arise either from the generality of the discretion conferred on the donee of the power or from the use of language that is so obscure as to be incapable of interpretation with any degree of precision using the ordinary tools". 49 14 conduct a s. 1 inquiry" but also admonished reviewing courts not to "have recourse" to administrative law unreasonableness save in "the clearest of cases in which a decision could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter" and emphasized the superiority of a proportionality analysis over an unreasonableness analysis where "contending values" are at play. 51 My interpretation is that Dickson C.J. was sceptical about the utility of administrative law where there are "contending values" but nonetheless acknowledged its potential as a screening device to ensure that government action is "prescribed by law".
Modern administrative law principles are significantly suppler and respond adequately to Dickson C.J.'s scepticism. As I explain in detail in Part V, they have the potential to significantly reinforce protection of Charter rights.
The type one/type two approach has an analytical appeal. Where a Charter right has been infringed by the action of an official operating under a grant of authority, the direct action infringing the right is that of the official. The grant of authority itself is not responsible: it was the way the official used it.
The attractions of this framework should not be lightly dismissed:
Much of the activity of government is carried on under the aegis of laws which of necessity leave a broad discretion to government officials. Since it may very well be reasonable in the circumstances to confer a wide discretion, it is preferable in the vast majority of cases to deal with vagueness in the context of a [proportionality] analysis rather than disqualifying the law in limine.
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The conceptual and analytical clarity of the Slaight Communications framework is appealing at first sight, but becomes less so on closer inspection.
(I) FORM AND SUBSTANCE
The first problem is that the Slaight Communications framework prioritizes the formal sense of the word "prescribed" to the detriment of its substantive sense. Ensuring simply that there is statutory authority for the impugned decision ignores another pressing issue: was the statutory authority appropriately framed? The problem is that while the substantive sense of "prescribed by law" denotes precision and intelligibility, the type 51 [1989] 15 two compartment of the Slaight Communications framework has no room for such concepts. A statutory power can be drawn in such wide terms as to render entirely unforeseeable and unpredictable when it will be exercised so as to infringe Charter rights, but will nonetheless be within the decision-maker's powers in a purely formal sense.
It is worth recalling the seminal judgment of Rand J. in Roncarelli v Duplessis:
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In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled "discretion", that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute. Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes but they are always implied as exceptions. "Discretion" necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty; there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption.
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The unfortunate effect is to undermine the "intelligible standard" test: if the decision is within a decision-maker's powers, it does not matter how widely-drawn or even arbitrary those powers are. And no matter how broad a discretion a decision-maker has been granted, the discretionary power will nonetheless have to be interpreted as containing some "intelligible standard", consistent with the teaching of Roncarelli.
Moreover, the Slaight Communications approach privileges a narrow conception of
what "prescribed by law" means as a matter of administrative law. It is equated with the absence altogether of jurisdiction, where the decision-maker simply has no power to act at all. 55 However, the Court has long taken the view that reviewing courts should not be "alert to brand" questions as jurisdictional in nature; 56 recently, it has held that such questions are "exceptional" and indeed presaged the abolition of the category of Under the Civil Code of Quebec (or the common law of other provinces) the Crown as property owner is entitled to withdraw permission from an invitee to be present on its property, subject always to the Charter. The act of the airport administrator in limiting expression pursuant to that power constitutes the exercise of a discretion conferred on his or her employer by the Code. The limit, in other words, results from the application of the Code. It follows that it is "prescribed by law"… 61 Indeed, the Slaight Communications framework also renders the "intelligible standard" test something of a dead letter in type one cases which also involve an element of discretion: that is, situations in which both type one and type two challenges can be brought. 62 Given that the inquiry in type one cases must focus in the first place on whether legislation expressly or by necessary implication infringes a Charter right, the utility of the "intelligible standard" test is debatable. A provision must be clear and precise in order to impose an express or necessarily implicit limitation. If this is the case, a limit which is express or necessarily implicit will of necessity contain an "intelligible standard"; otherwise, it could not limit the right at all. No advertisement will be accepted which is likely, in the light of prevailing community standards, to cause offence to any person or group of persons or create controversy.
In laying out the test to determine whether policies can qualify as "law" within the meaning of section 1, 64 Deschamps J. conflated the inquiry into whether the policies exhibited an "intelligible principle" with the inquiry into whether they imposed, expressly or by necessary implication, a limitation on a Charter right:
The policies are not administrative in nature, as they are not meant for internal use as an interpretive aid for "rules" laid down in the legislative scheme. Rather, the policies are themselves rules that establish the rights of the individuals to whom they apply. Moreover, the policies can be said to be general in scope, since they establish standards which are applicable to all who want to take advantage of the advertising service rather than to a specific case. They therefore fall within the meaning of the word "law" for the purposes of section 1 and will satisfy the "prescribed by law" requirement provided that they are sufficiently accessible and precise.
In my view, the transit authorities' advertising policies are both accessible and precise. They are made available to members of the general public who wish to advertise on the transit authorities' buses, and they clearly outline the types of advertisements that will or will not be accepted. Thus, the limits on expression are accessible and are worded precisely enough to enable potential advertisers to understand what is prohibited. The limits resulting from the policies are therefore legislative in nature and are "limits prescribed by law" within the meaning of s. 1 of the Charter.
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It is not the fault of Deschamps J. that her analysis proceeded in this fashion. The logic of the Slaight Communications framework leads reviewing courts away from application of the "intelligible principle" standard. 
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In both type one and type two cases, the "intelligible principle" standard is difficult to accommodate within the Slaight Communications framework. The problem is especially acute in type two cases. It is only once a court finds that no limit has been expressly or implicitly imposed on a Charter right -which effectively means that no "intelligible principle" can be ascertained -that the inquiry shifts to administrative law. Sweeping powers must necessarily have been delegated to the administrative decision-maker in question because no limitation on Charter rights could be discerned from the wording of the statute; by definition, no "intelligible standard" was available. At this point, tools of interpretation may circumscribe the discretion somewhat, but they can never do so completely. The unfortunate tendency is to promote broadly drawn administrative discretion.
(II) ACCOUNTABILITY
The second problem is that the distinction creates a temptation for legislators to vest broad discretion in administrative decision-makers, rather than enacting detailed statutory provisions. A statutory limitation on Charter rights would have to survive the "rigours of the law-making process" 66 and, additionally, those of the Oakes test. A broad discretion, which would permit an administrative decision-maker to infringe on individuals' Charter rights, is not subject to the same limitations. 67 Indeed, when infringements of Charter rights result from exercises of administrative discretion rather than clear statutory rules (or even internal guidelines 68 ) , it can become difficult to assign responsibility for Charter violations. The individual decision-maker's hands may be tied by internal administrative practices and the expectations of his or her superiors, 69 information which may be entirely unknown to the citizenry at large. As Sopinka J. once put it, "avoidance of a Charter violation cannot be delegated to a prosecutor whose conduct is not circumscribed by guidelines which are enforceable in a court of law", 70 a comment which is no less apt for having been uttered in dissent. Clear statutory provisions or guidelines make the task of assigning responsibility much more 19 straightforward. The task of advocating for reform is also much easier, as clear targets and proposals for change can be identified.
To an extent, it is true that administrative decision-making "finds its authority in actual endorsement by a legislative superior". 71 However, given that, in Westminster systems, the executive has a significant degree of control over the legislative process, the current framework "creates the perverse incentive for governments to implement constitutionally controversial policies in secret through sub-legal means". 72 If many violations of Charter rights are due to individualized decisions, "justice to individual parties is administered more outside courts than in them" 73 and protection of Charter rights will be weakened: an administrative decision-maker attempting to justify a decision will have fewer hurdles to scale than a legislature. An accountability deficit thus seems to be an unfortunate side-effect of the application of the Slaight Communications framework.
(III) PROTECTION FOR CHARTER RIGHTS
The third problem is that the "prescribed by law" barrier can be easily overcome. 74 The lack of clarity of the distinction between "law" and "discretion" (see below, text accompanying nn. 80-85) might have some salutary effects in this respect. If legislatures cannot tell in advance how a court will categorise a particular statutory scheme, it becomes harder to utilise the distinction between "law" and "discretion" in such a manner as to provoke accountability concerns. 75 [1990] 1 SCR 1257 (SCC). A limit which is vague, ambiguous, uncertain, or subject to discretionary determination is, by that fact alone, an unreasonable limit. If a citizen cannot know with tolerable certainty the extent to which the exercise of a guaranteed freedom may be restrained, he is likely to be deterred from conduct which is, in fact, lawful and not prohibited. Uncertainty and vagueness are constitutional vices when they are used to restrain constitutionally protected rights and freedoms.
While there can never be absolute certainty, a limitation of a guaranteed right must be such as to allow a very high degree of predictability of the legal consequences.
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A more imposing barrier would ensure a greater measure of protection for Charter rights.
(IV) A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEM
The fourth problem is with the distinction between type one and type two cases, between general norms and individualized decisions:
Unfortunately, the Slaight framework contains a fatal flaw. The framework requires a reliable means of distinguishing between Charter limits occurring as a result of law and as a result of discretion. According to Slaight, this distinction lies in determining whether or not the legislation in issue "confers, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to infringe a protected right." If the law confers the power to limit Charter rights, then the limit is attributed to the law and the prescribed by law condition is met unless the law fails the intelligible-21 standard test. If instead the law confers an imprecise discretion, then the limit is attributed to the decision and the prescribed by law analysis turns on the statutory authority of the decision maker. The choice is either/or: either the Charter limit is contained in the law or it is contained in discretion. The ultimate success or failure of a Charter challenge may hinge on how the challenge is categorized according to this preliminary distinction.
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But if one takes the view that discretion is like toothpaste in a tube in its capacity to relocate itself depending on external pressures, the distinction between "law" and "discretion" makes little or no sense, because they "cannot be relegated into conceptually distinct categories but necessarily exist in combination". 82 Even in the most detailed statutory scheme, some decision-maker, somewhere, will have to decide whether or not to apply the law in a particular case. A dispassionate reader of the statute book may reach a different conclusion to the decision-maker charged with administering the statute:
"because rules are purposive devices (they are techniques to effectuate a broader policy) and because language is largely uncertain in its application to situations that cannot be foreseen, the applier of a rule will frequently have a degree of discretion in interpreting its scope". 83 Even if one does not adopt such a sceptical position, the distinction remains problematic:
It is…inaccurate to speak of a rigid dichotomy of "discretionary" or "nondiscretionary" decisions. Most administrative decisions involve the exercise of implicit discretion in relation to many aspects of decision making. To give just one example, decision-makers may have considerable discretion as to the remedies they order. In addition, there is no easy distinction to be made between interpretation and the exercise of discretion; interpreting legal rules involves considerable discretion to clarify, fill in legislative gaps, and make choices among various options.
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In one sense, whether the scope of a discretionary power encompasses infringements of Charter rights is simply a question of interpretation. In another sense, however, the Unsurprisingly, Canadian courts have proved unable in practice to employ the distinction in a clear and consistent manner in their "prescribed by law" jurisprudence:
[C]ourts are unable to agree on the point at which law ends and discretion begins -the point at which they must set aside their legal tools of statutory interpretation and vagueness in deference to the administrator's own interpretation of his or her authority. The elegant distinction between law and discretion, on which the Slaight framework depends, falls apart in practice...
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The problem is not just a practical one. The location of the line between "law" and "discretion" must be uncertain. If we conceive of a spectrum, with "law" marking one end and "discretion" the other, it is clear that there will, at the very least, be borderline cases, where the classification of a statutory scheme will not be self-evident. If this is so, one of its central pillars is not capable of supporting the weight of the Slaight Communications framework. Some shakiness is to be expected.
(V) CROSS-FERTILIZATION
The final problem -perhaps a shortcoming, rather than a problem -is minor compared to the others, but it is important to mention. The Slaight Communications framework suggests that administrative review and constitutional review exist in watertight compartments and that the one can be conducted without any attention to the other. But this cannot possibly be correct. Lamer J., the architect of the framework, was at pains to point out in subsequent decisions that, prior to determining whether a decision-maker had acted intra vires, it would be necessary to define the scope of the decision-maker's authority. This necessarily involves "applying the rules of statutory 85 On the difficulties attendant on reliance on the law/fact distinction see [C]onstitutional documents like the Charter set out the norms that are most highly valued in our culture. For this reason, quite apart from questions of validity or showing deference to the legislature, it is appropriate for courts to prefer interpretations that tend to promote those norms over interpretations that do not.
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Indeed, such an approach may be necessary in order to give effect to both the English and French versions of section 1:
Read purposefully, "règle de droit" in the French version of s. 1 could be interpreted to refer directly to the legislation that authorizes administrative decision-making. On this reading, inquiry under s. 1 would begin by considering whether the scope of the authorization contained in the legislation itself -the règle de droit -encompasses the power to make the decision under scrutiny. Scope in this context refers to the statutory authority to make decisions based on either a grant of discretionary authority or the interpretation and application of a legislative provision. If the decision under review falls within the scope of the authorizing legislation in either case, then arguably, in an important sense, it is the legislation itself, the règle de droit, that is limiting the Charter right, and we are within the ordinary meaning of the French text. Moreover, if the relevant legislation is interpreted to have the requisite scope to authorize the decision under scrutiny, then the limit in question will necessarily be a limit prescribed by law, and we are within the accepted meaning of the English text of s. 1.
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A minimum amount of "cross-fertilization" between administrative law and constitutional law is thus unavoidable, especially in light of the need to give effect to both the English and French versions of the Charter.
Moreover, the framework suggests that argument might proceed along two entirely different tracks: the parties argue first on administrative law and then switch to constitutional law. In practice, however, it is more likely that the two will overlap and interlock in such a way that they simply cannot be kept separate. 
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IV. MULTANI AND THE DORÉ MISSTEP
(I) EXACERBATING THE PROBLEMS OF THE SLAIGHT COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK
The starting point here is provided by the concurring reasons of Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani. They advocated a distinction between general norms and individualized decisions, the former subject to the Oakes test and the latter to review for reasonableness in accordance with the principles of administrative law:
In our opinion, the administrative law approach must be retained for reviewing decisions and orders made by administrative bodies. A constitutional justification analysis must, on the other hand, be carried out when reviewing the validity or enforceability of a norm such as a law, regulation, or other similar rule of general application.
26 put a tribunal in a difficult position when attempting to justify a decision, 102 Prior to turning to the merits of the case, Abella J. returned to the distinction between general norms and individualized decisions first introduced in Multani:
When Charter values are applied to an individual administrative decision, they are being applied in relation to a particular set of facts. Dunsmuir tells us this should attract deference…When a particular "law" is being assessed for Charter compliance, on the other hand, we are dealing with principles of general application.
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Justice Abella then formulated the following guidance for reviewing courts:
On judicial review, the question becomes whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at play...If, in exercising its statutory discretion, the decision-maker has properly balanced the relevant Charter value with the statutory objectives, the decision will be found to be reasonable.
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References to "rigorous Charter protection" notwithstanding, 113 it is difficult to see how this explicitly deferential standard of review better protects Charter rights than does the Oakes test. Instead of the robust, well-known and well-defined proportionality analysis, reviewing courts are henceforth required to conduct some sort of balancing test.
The ultimate conclusion in Doré is not encouraging. Justice Abella upheld the sanction imposed on the lawyer, holding that given the "excessive degree of vituperation in the 109 Code de déontologie des avocats, RRQ, c B-1, r 3. 110 It is worth noting a couple of mis-steps on Justice Abella's part. For one thing, at paras 52 and 53, she wrongly conflates the application of the proportionality test with review for correctness. It is in fact a review for proportionality, not correctness, and does not allow the reviewing court to step into the shoes of a decision-maker exercising a discretionary power. Why? The correct interpretation of the Charter is that proportionate limitations on rights are acceptable, not that whenever a Charter challenge is made the reviewing court must substitute its judgment for that of the decision-maker. framework. Previously, free-wheeling administrative discretion used to infringe Charter rights would nonetheless be subject to rigorous review for compliance with the Oakes test. Now, however, free-wheeling administrative discretion remains, and the only check on its exercise is whether the decision-maker arrived at a "proportionate balancing" of Charter rights with its statutory objectives. Charron J.'s concern that Charter rights could be reduced to "mere administrative law principles" seems all the more apt in light of Doré. A good starting point here is the nuanced position adopted by LeBel J in his concurring reasons in Multani. He agreed with the majority that a purely administrative law approach would be insufficiently protective of Charter rights, but suggested that the 119 There is reference in the introductory part of Abella J.'s opinion to not wanting to undermine the integrity of either administrative law or constitutional law (at para 4). There is also reference -on a generous reading -to the concept of minimal impairment (at para 7), but if the whole point of the exercise in Doré was to jettison the Oakes test as far as individualized decisions are concerned, it is difficult to see the logic of retaining its multiple prongs (though, clearly, I take the view that the Oakes test should not have been thrown overboard). Proportionality may yet have a place in the application of the reasonableness standard, but its role would be necessarily modest. 
(II) CHARTER REVIEW OF INDIVIDUALIZED DECISIONS
Motivating the concurrences in
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proportionality test should not be applied rigidly to individualized decisions. In assessing challenges to such decisions on Charter grounds, …it may be possible to dispense with certain steps of the analysis. The existence of a statutory authority that is not itself challenged makes it pointless to review the objectives of the act. The issue becomes one of proportionality or, more specifically, minimal limitation of the guaranteed right, having regard to the context in which the right has been infringed. 120 Clearly, the very appropriateness of Oakes was under attack from the concurring judges in Multani, which ultimately led to a decisive victory in Doré.
A. THE ENGLISH POSITION
In England, the position is clear by virtue of the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, which explicitly makes it "unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right". 121 As explained in the Government White Paper which presaged the Act:
A person who is aggrieved by an act or omission on the part of a public authority which is incompatible with the Convention rights will be able to challenge the act or omission in the courts. The effects will be wide-ranging. They will extend both to legal actions which a public authority pursues against individuals (for example, where a criminal prosecution is brought or where an administrative decision is being enforced through legal proceedings) and to cases which individuals pursue against a public authority (for example, for judicial review of an executive decision).
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To In Pinnock, the Court went on to assess whether the order entered against the applicant was proportionate. Generally, Lord Neuberger noted, it would be difficult for a tenant to successfully make out an argument based on article 8:
[T]he proportionality of making an order for possession at the suit of the local authority will be supported not merely by the fact that it would serve to vindicate the authority's ownership rights. It will also, at least normally, be supported by the fact that it would enable the authority to comply with its duties in relation to the distribution and management of its housing stock, including, for example, the fair allocation of its housing, the redevelopment of the site, the refurbishing of sub-standard accommodation, the need to move people who are in accommodation that now exceeds their needs, and the need to move vulnerable people into sheltered or warden-assisted housing. Furthermore, in many cases (such as this appeal) other cogent reasons, such as the need to remove a source of nuisance to neighbours, may support the proportionality of dispossessing the occupiers.
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In other words, there will almost always be a legitimate objective motivating the seeking of the possession order: vindication of ownership rights and satisfaction of statutory aims. Similarly, a rational connection between these aims and the possession order will be easily made out: retaking possession of the property would facilitate the achievement of the legitimate objective or objectives. In addition, the overall benefits from (as in Pinnock) reducing neighbourhood nuisances and facilitating the allocation of housing to those in need would outweigh the deleterious effects on the individual who is the subject of the possession order. These factors will almost always weigh in favour of granting the order. Nevertheless, unlike with the reasonableness test, the onus will be on the administrative decision-maker to demonstrate that its powers were used in furtherance of its statutory objectives and that there was a rational basis for doing so. This reversal of the onus of proof from the reasonableness test is useful from the point of view of the individual concerned. Protection of rights is undoubtedly enhanced, even if only marginally.
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Finally, "in some cases there may be factors which would tell the other way". 34 deleterious effects on the individual as to cause the granting of a possession order to fail to satisfy the fourth prong of the proportionality test: it would be disproportionate stricto sensu. Secondly, that the article 8 rights of the individual should not be impaired more than is necessary to achieve a legitimate objective or objectives. In cases where the local authority could rely on other means to achieve its aims, granting the possession order against an individual could be adjudged disproportionate. It might only be in exceptional cases that such an argument could be successfully made out, but at least the individual will be given the opportunity to make the argument.
The key point to take away from this discussion is that application of the Oakes test to individualized decisions is eminently feasible. Moreover, it is desirable. As La Forest J. explained in an extradition case, Canada v Schmidt, 135 "it does not follow from the fact that the procedure is generally justifiable that the manner in which the procedures are conducted and the conditions under which a fugitive is surrendered can never invite
Charter scrutiny". 136 Merely applying Charter scrutiny to a statutory framework is insufficient; its operation in practice should also invite keen judicial oversight.
B. NORMS AND DECISIONS
Beyond the feasibility and desirability of applying the Oakes test to individualized decisions, Abella J. posits in Doré that there is a neat distinction to be made between general norms and individualized decisions. However, the most persistent criticism of the 
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Leaving aside the practical difficulties the courts have had with the distinction, there are three damning theoretical difficulties. First, decisions both reflect and establish norms. A decision does not spring full-formed from the womb of an administrative decision-maker; it must draw its shape from some ulterior source. And once released into the world, a decision too has normative consequences. It becomes (or at the very least, can become) an indication of the norm a decision-maker has applied and intends to apply.
Individualized decisions can set standards just as effectively as general norms can.
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Second, both decisions and norms are Janus-faced. They look to the past and to the future. Decisions almost always look to the past, because they seek to impose consequences on events that have already taken place. For norms, the past is a source of standards embodied in previous decisions and the location of mischief sought to be regulated. Norms almost always look to the future, because they seek to impose consequences on events that have not yet taken place, and to shape future actions of targeted individuals or groups. For decisions, the future is important too, because a decision has a lasting effect on the conduct of an individual or group subject to it, and on the conduct of those who learn of the decision. Thirdly, in terms of clarity, accessibility and precision, qualities usually associated with norms, individualized decisions are just as clear, accessible (always to the parties and sometimes to the community at large) and precise. 140 Indeed, given that they focus on concrete parties and concrete events, decisions may be clearer, more accessible and more precise than individualized decisions.
Individualized decisions, in sum, can bear what the Court has identified as the hallmark of general norms:
[T]heir adoption is authorized by statute, they are binding rules of general application, and they are sufficiently accessible and precise to those to whom they apply. In these regards, they satisfy the concerns that underlie the "prescribed by law" requirement insofar as they preclude arbitrary state action and provide individuals and government entities with sufficient information on how they should conduct themselves.
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If this is indeed the case, the reasoning in Doré only exacerbates the problems of the Slaight Communications framework. Distinctions are, as I suggested at the outset, probably inevitable when it comes to interpreting and enforcing the "prescribed by law" requirement. But the reliance on this particular distinction is especially problematic:
although it is inherently flawed, its application determines whether the Oakes test or a reasonableness test applies. Conferring such importance on such an unworkable distinction does nothing to further the functions of the "prescribed by law" requirement.
In short, the Court would do better to heed the advice of Charron J. in Multani and continue to apply the Oakes test to individualized decisions that infringe Charter rights. 37 approach to section 1 and the "prescribed by law" requirement, 146 he sounded a cautionary note: "The precise relationship between the traditional standard of administrative law review of patent unreasonableness and the new constitutional standard of review will be worked out in future cases". 147 In particular, the then-prevailing conception of unreasonableness in Canadian administrative law was said to rest "to a large extent on unarticulated and undeveloped values" and to lack "the same degree of structure and sophistication of analysis" as the Oakes test. 148 All a reviewing court was bound to ask was whether a given administrative interpretation of law was "so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review".
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In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 150 however, the Court offered a much richer conception:
Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. power to develop such criteria. 155 Failure to use that power should result in reviewing courts striking down their decision-making processes as unreasonable and, accordingly, as failing the "prescribed by law" standard.
(II) STRUCTURING AND CONFINING DISCRETION
What would this mean in practice? Internal, though public, guidelines confiningthrough the development of "meaningful standards" -structuring -through the development of "plans, policy statements and rules" -and checking -through internal 153 Canada (Attorney General) 
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"supervision and review" -discretionary powers would be a means of avoiding a finding of unreasonableness. 156 Through the process of developing general guidelines, administrative decision-makers can "move from vague or absent statutory standards to reasonably definite standards, and then, as experience and understanding develop, to guiding principles, and finally, when the subject-matter permits, to precise and detailed rules". 157 If a decision-maker is likely to exercise its powers in violation of Charter rights, it would be better-advised to confine, structure and check them so as to avoid failing the "prescribed by law" test. 158 The reference to meaningful standards is not accidental. For example, in Little Sisters, the "high-handed and dismissive" treatment of the freedom of expression of a bookstore specializing in gay and lesbian material occurred even though there were guidelines in place to regulate customs officers' inspections of allegedly obscene material. These guidelines were routinely ignored, however. 159 A court assessing the justification, intelligibility and transparency of the decision-making process could not overlook such systemic failures.
A. TRIGGER: BREACH OF CHARTER RIGHT
My approach does not require administrative decision-makers to develop internal checks and balances. To require otherwise would be to require all holders of delegated authority to develop guidelines for the use of their powers, even if those powers were never used in such a way as to infringe Charter rights. Plainly, this would be too much; 40 accordingly, an applicant would have to demonstrate the infringement of a Charter right.
Violation of a Charter right is a trigger for guidelines, but it is also a limitation: if no Charter violation can be made out, then there is no question that the decision will lack justification, transparency and intelligibility due to the absence of guidelines alone (it may, of course, be unreasonable on other grounds, or be procedurally unfair). Given that the thresholds for finding violations of Charter rights are generally quite low -on the basis that justification under section 1 will be possible -this trigger requirement should not be overly demanding.
B. OTHER LIMITING CRITERIA 160
Reasonableness is not a monolithic standard. As the Court has been at pains to point out: "Reasonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from the context". 161 Courts should be watchful, but not overbearing:
Of course, another insight from administrative law is valuable in guiding the Charter's application to discretion, and that is the importance of recognizing the diversity of discretionary settings and that one-size may not fit all settings. 162 Accordingly, in some cases, the "context" might not be favourable to public guidelines. In other words, in some cases where no guidelines have been formulated, or they have been kept secret, or some other means of confining, structuring and checking discretion has successfully been employed, a decision-maker might be able to justify its decision-making process, even if a Charter right has been violated.
On some occasions, a need for secrecy might be overriding. For example, public safety might be imperilled if malefactors had full details of border security operations, which are liable to risk infringing on the Charter. 163 Similarly, administrative efficiency and responsiveness might be compromised in some situations if guidelines were required, 41 especially if Charter violating conduct was the exception and not the norm. 164 And sometimes, only the most general standards can be of any utility to decision-makers. If this can be demonstrated in a cogent and convincing manner, a reviewing court should not find a decision-making process to be unreasonable. 165 As Lamer J. once noted, "administrative expediency certainly has its place in administrative law".
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Justice Charron was alive to these sorts of concerns in R v Orbanski:
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The scope of justifiable police conduct will not always be defined by express wording found in a statute but, rather, according to the purpose of the police power in question and by the particular circumstances in which it is exercised…In this context, it becomes particularly important to keep in mind that any enforcement scheme must allow sufficient flexibility to be effective.
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In some circumstances, the manner in which discretionary powers are exercised will lead itself to moderation. Justice Sopinka had something like this in mind when he drew a contrast between police checkpoints and a free-wheeling power to pull over any motorist:
Random checking at a stationary, predetermined location infringes the right [to freedom from arbitrary detention] much less than the unlimited right contended for. The decision to locate the check point will be made either by a superior officer or by the decision of several officers. While the decision as to which automobile will be stopped will be made by an individual officer, his conduct can be observed by other officers. Since he has limited time to observe a vehicle, his decision will be either truly random or based on some objective basis. The result is that this method of enforcement is somewhat more carefully designed to serve enforcement, less intrusive, and not as open to abuse as the unlimited power sought to be justified.
reasonable, perhaps even in situations where previous decisions or general guidelines are not available for public consumption.
However, decision-makers should not be allowed to invoke concerns for efficiency and security without providing reasons and even evidence to corroborate their fears.
Moreover, as against justifiable, verifiable concerns for good administration should be balanced the severity of the interference with a Charter right, as well as -if available, the prevalence of past violations and the likelihood of future infringements. Sensitivity to context requires sensitivity to these issues, in line with the Court's even-handed administrative law jurisprudence.
The doctrinal proposal that an absence of guidelines can lead an administrative decision-maker to follow a flawed decision-making process helps to achieve the goals of the "prescribed by law" requirement of section 1. Above all, it provides individuals with an additional shield to fend off Charter violations.
A. THE RULE OF LAW
It is precisely the concerns for foreseeability and precision which underpin the The Code will normally provide sufficient guidance to Crown Prosecutors and to the public as to how decisions should or are likely to be taken whether or not, in a given case, it will be in the public interest to prosecute. This is a valuable safeguard for the vulnerable, as it enables the prosecutor to take into account the whole background of the case. In most cases its application will ensure 43 predictability and consistency of decision-taking, and people will know where they stand.
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Indeed, the ultimate outcome of the Purdy litigation was a revised Code which sought to more clearly delineate the circumstances in which a prosecution would be undertaken. 172 By laying out the relevant factors in a precise and accessible manner, the Director of Public Prosecutions could protect himself against future article 8 attacks.
More importantly, individuals liable to be prosecuted for assisting terminally ill patients to shuffle off this mortal coil could determine in advance the likelihood of prosecution.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY
In part, concerns about accountability motivated Deschamps and Abella JJ. in
Multani:
[The Oakes] test is based on the duty of the executive and legislative branches of government to account to the courts for any rules they establish that infringe protected rights.…The duty to account imposed -conceptually and in practiceon the legislative and executive branches is not easily applied to administrative tribunals.
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It is certainly true that the democracy-forcing features of the "prescribed by law" requirement cohere best with laws enacted after due consideration by federal or provincial legislatures. Nevertheless, to think that only the ordinary process of lawmaking can serve this accountability function is to ignore the democratic potential of guidelines. Once general guidelines are developed, they can be subjected to legitimate or popular oversight and criticism. Either the decision-maker, or the legislature, can amend the guidelines in response to popular criticism. Just as setting out clear rules in legislation to cabin discretion can provoke dialogue between courts and legislatures, 174 resort to guidelines can provoke dialogue between courts, legislatures, and decision-makers.
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While one can rightly prefer majoritarian approval as a "procedural precondition" to the Oakes test, 175 the Slaight Communications framework legitimizes broad grants of discretion. Some response is necessary. Otherwise, "Charter violations would be attributed to aberrational official conduct and not to the systemic flaws of the discretionary legislative scheme", 176 allowing legislators and members of the executive branch to sidestep responsibility. If the criteria for the exercise of a discretionary power are shrouded in secrecy, popular debate is hampered and projects for reform will struggle to get off the ground. Taking seriously the need for justification, intelligibility and transparency in the decision-making process and requiring the development of "soft law" methods of confining, structuring and checking discretion reinvigorates this function of the "prescribed by law" requirement.
C. PROTECTION FOR CHARTER RIGHTS
Paying attention to the requirements of administrative law would increase the level of protection for Charter rights, by adding an extra hurdle to that imposed by the Oakes test. Consider a concern raised by Sopinka J in R v Ladouceur. 177 At issue here was whether a provision in a provincial highway code allowing a police officer to stop a motorist if doing so would be "in the lawful execution of his duties and responsibilities" 178 entitled police officers to conduct random spot checks. Even though the Court 'read down' the statutory powers, this was not enough to satisfy Sopinka J. As he correctly observed, there might be no means of holding an officer to account for an individualized decision:
The roving random stop would permit any individual officer to stop any vehicle, at any time, at any place. The decision may be based on any whim. Individual officers will have different reasons. Some may tend to stop younger drivers, others older cars, and so on. Indeed...racial considerations may be a factor too. My colleague states that in such circumstances, a Charter violation may be made out. If, however, no reason need be given nor is necessary, how will we ever know? The officer need only say, 'I stopped the vehicle because I have the right to stop it for no reason. I am seeking unlicensed drivers'. If there are bound to be 45 instances where admittedly Charter violations which cannot be justified will occur, can we overlook these and approve a practice even if in its general application Charter breaches can be justified? Charter rights, something they could not achieve following the conventional constitutional law route.
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D. DISCRETION AND CROSS-FERTILIZATION
I cannot, I fear, offer a solution to the intractable difficulties courts have faced in distinguishing between "law" and "discretion" in the context of section 1. However, the practical importance of the distinction is reduced by recourse to administrative law.
Requiring decision-makers to confine, structure and check themselves pushes discretion towards "law" and replaces uncertainty with generality. Indeed, on occasion, guidelines may themselves become "law" for the purposes of the section 1 analysis and be subjected to the Oakes test. 181 This would be entirely proper:
Any policy with a meaningful influence over a discretionary decision should comply with the Charter -whether it is categorized as internal or external should not be relevant to the analysis. The Court must be alive to the reality of decisionmaking from the vantage of the decision-maker and the affected party. Where a decision-maker relies on law, the Court's focus should be on the law. Where a decision-maker relies on law and policy, the Court's focus should be on law and policy. Where the decision-maker relies on internal directives, or ingrained practices, then those should be the focus. The search for clear, bright-line distinctions in the context of discretion is ultimately not tenable.
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The proposed "meaningful influence" test may too prove difficult in practice. The key point, however, is that guidelines too can have the status of "law" for the purposes of section 1. 
VI. CONCLUSION
What of
